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1. Summary
We demonstrate that individual behaviours directed at the
attainment of distinctiveness can in fact produce complete social
conformity. We thus offer an unexpected generative mechanism
for this central social phenomenon. Specifically, we establish
that agents who have fixed needs to be distinct and adapt
their positions to achieve distinctiveness goals, can nevertheless
self-organize to a limiting state of absolute conformity. This
seemingly paradoxical result is deduced formally from a small
number of natural assumptions and is then explored at length
computationally. Interesting departures from this conformity
equilibrium are also possible, including divergence in positions.
The effect of extremist minorities on these dynamics is discussed.
A simple extension is then introduced, which allows the
model to generate and maintain social diversity, including
multimodal distinctiveness distributions. The paper contributes
formal definitions, analytical deductions and counterintuitive
findings to the literature on individual distinctiveness and
social conformity.
2. Introduction
Few would dispute that we humans make appraisals of our
individual ‘distinctiveness’, that we differ in our needs to
appear distinct, and that we take actions (e.g. we alter our
appearance or expressed opinions) to attain our distinctiveness
goals. Furthermore, preferences for distinctiveness and the
associated remedial adaptation strategies are at work in the
formation of social groups and networks, and in other cultural
dynamics such as assimilation or polarization. However, in
the broad literature on the psychology and sociology of
distinctiveness [1–11], there is little mathematical precision in
defining ‘distinctiveness preferences’, and little explicit modelling
of the individual behaviours adopted to satisfy them or the
collective dynamics generated by these individual adaptations.
2015 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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Most formal models dealing with individual preferences for differentiation posit strict anti-conformity,
in which agents adopt whatever position constitutes the minority at a given time [12–16]. Such individual
behaviour of course endogenously alters the distribution of positions and can produce interesting social
dynamics. But it precludes the emergence of conformity, our core concern. Relatedly, Smaldino et al. [17]
modelled individuals with preferences for membership in groups with different degrees of numerical
predominance but this model was not concerned with individual differences or distinctiveness within
a population.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous model has formally defined distinctiveness preferences
as we do, or shown that the pursuit of distinctiveness, thus defined, can lead to conformity. We provide
simple and intuitive formal definitions of distinctiveness preferences and the individual actions aimed at
satisfying them and show that these yield counterintuitive social dynamics. Foremost among these is that
a population of agents with fixed needs to be distinct can self-organize into a state of strict conformity.
We then show how an elementary, but also novel, extension of the model facilitates sustained diversity
in attributes of interest. We conclude with a brief discussion of several lines for future research.
3. Model 1: Distinctiveness in units of standard deviation
To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we imagine a fixed population of N agents. They have only
the following four very simple attributes: a position, information about the distribution of positions, a
distinctiveness goal and an adjustment rule. Time in this model is discrete.
(1) Position: At every time, t, each agent has an observable ‘position’, xi(t). Position is a
one-dimensional real-valued feature that agents can adjust.
For example, position could be an expressed taste or location on a left-right political spectrum. It is not
a location in any landscape, network or other physical coordinate system. This version of the model is
spaceless in that sense. Agents interact only with aggregate variables—the mean and standard deviation
of a distribution. They do not interact directly with one another. One could of course introduce spatial
coordinates, neighbourhoods, networks and direct interaction with other agents, but we hold off on these
complexities here.
(2) Information: Each agent is assumed to know its own position, and to correctly estimate (i.e. to
intuit) the mean x¯(t) and standard deviation σ (t) of positions in the population.
Given a distribution of positions, it strikes us as natural to define distinctiveness in terms of deviations
from the mean. The simple intuition is that, in a drab office where jet black suits are the norm, a dark
grey one may turn heads, whereas the ambient diversity of Times Square requires far more flamboyance
to be noticed. So, a fixed distinctiveness preference (in standard deviations) may elicit radically different
behaviours in different settings. Accordingly, we define ideal distinctiveness as follows.
(3) Ideal Position: Agents have a fixed and unobservable distinctiveness preference, δi.
This parameter characterizes the individual’s ideal position; it is not absolute, but relative to other
agents in the population. Specifically, at any time, the ith agent’s ideal position x∗i (t) is given by
x∗i (t) = x¯(t) + δiσ (t), (3.1)
where σ (t) is the standard deviation of the population’s current positions.
A positive value for δi indicates an ideal position δi deviations above (e.g. to the political right of) the
population mean; a negative value indicates an ideal position δi deviations below it. Some people might
need to be three sigmas (δi = 3) from the mean; others are content to hover near the average. We do
not assume that any individual is consciously aware of, or could ‘tell you’, their delta, only that these
preferences exist, and that agents adapt to satisfy them.
Note that, because ideal position is by definition relative to the distribution of other agents positions,
different positions may be satisfactory (i.e. equal to an agent’s ideal position) at different times,
corresponding to different distributions of positions in the population. By the same token, a specific
position may confer ideal distinctiveness today, but not tomorrow, if the positions of other agents shift.
Of course, individuals may find themselves in positions that fail to satisfy their need for distinctiveness.
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In such cases, they adjust their positions to better satisfy this need. As the simplest (error-correction type)
mechanism, we posit the following.
(4) Positional Adjustment Rule: At time t + 1, individuals adjust their positions at a rate
proportional to their distance from the ideal at time t. Specifically, with x∗i (t) given by equation (3.1),
each individual updates her position according to
xi(t + 1) = xi(t) + k[x∗i (t) − xi(t)], (3.2)
where 0 < k < 1 is an adjustment rate. (We exclude 0 and 1 since they, respectively, cancel all
dynamics or impose equilibrium in one step.)
So, the farther is your current position from that which would satisfy your (fixed) need for
distinctiveness, the greater is your adjustment in observable position. Equivalently, under this rule, an
individual far from her ideal position will move faster than an individual close to it. Several extensions
and refinements are discussed later, but this (1)–(4) is the complete agent specification. Though spare, the
range of social dynamics is surprisingly rich.
3.1. Behaviour of the mean
The first question one might pose is: given a population of individuals with initial positions xi(0)
and distinctiveness preferences δi, how will the mean position behave? After a modicum of algebra
(see appendix B), we derive the change in the mean position x¯ to be given by
x¯ = k
N
∑
i
[x¯(t) + δiσ (t) − xi(t)], (3.3)
which, by equation (3.1), is simply
x¯ = k
N
∑
i
[x∗i (t) − xi(t)]. (3.4)
Equation (3.4) implies that the mean position will not change if each individual is in an optimally
distinct position, because if xi = x∗i , the right-hand side is zero. A different type of equilibrium is where
agents are all placed at the same position. Whatever that common position may be, the mean will not
change because in this case the mean is the common position and the standard deviation is zero. So,
by equation (3.3), there is no change in position. In this sense, any possible position is an equilibrium,
and the common position in which they are placed will be regarded by all agents as ideal. However, so
long as initial positions are not ideal or identical, no equilibrium is strictly attained, because the variance
will never reach zero, but only approach it as a limit. Our first and central result, whose robustness we
explore in a number of settings, is that convergence towards this conformity limit occurs despite positive
distinctiveness preferences.
3.2. Conformity despite a single global preference for distinctiveness
We begin with the simplest case, in which all individuals have the same fixed positive distinctiveness
preference, δ (i.e. ∀i, δi = δ > 0). Equation (3.3) then becomes simply
x¯ = kδσ (t). (3.5)
Since kδ is a constant, the rate of change in the mean position will be proportional to the standard
deviation of individual positions. But, what becomes of the standard deviation itself? It can be proved
(see appendix C) that
σ 2(t + 1) = (1 − k)2σ 2(t). (3.6)
This first-order difference equation is solvable analytically for the time evolution of variance. Starting
with any specified initial variance σ 2(0), we have
σ 2(t) = (1 − k)2tσ 2(0). (3.7)
Equation (3.7) makes clear that conformity (the zero variance state) is a limit. As noted earlier, if all
agents are placed at a point, no one will depart. So, any position can be an equilibrium. But because k
is a real number strictly less than one, these equilibria, though attractors, are not strictly attainable from
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Figure 1. The systemconverges ona single valuewhenall individuals share the samepreferreddistinctiveness.Wefirst illustrate example
trajectories for (a) δ = 1 and (b) δ = 3. (c) Equilibrium positions at convergence limit as a function of δ for several distributions of initial
positions. For these and all other runs, N = 500, k = 0.01.
non-equilibrium positions.1 For any specified real number z> 0, however small, there is a time tz after
which the standard deviation is less than z. In any particular case, the waiting time will depend on k, δ
and other factors. As it does not affect our thrust here, waiting time will not be further pursued.
Note that, although by equation (3.5) the mean position depends on δ, by equation (3.7) the variance
does not, but rather changes at a rate determined entirely by k. This difference between the two moments’
dynamics is illustrated in figure 1a,b. In both cases, initial positions are randomly drawn from the
uniform distribution U(−1, 1). The variance converges to zero in both cases, but the mean increases
more with δ = 3 than it does with δ = 1, as the above analytics would predict. Figure 1c illustrates
that the exact limiting position depends on both δ and the initial distribution of positions. Here, initial
positions are drawn from various beta distributions, transformed so that the support is [−1, 1]. (The
uniform distribution is recovered when α = β = 1; figure 6.) For each such distribution, we plot the
single common position towards which all agents converge as δ is increased from zero to 10. Despite
fixed common preferences for individual distinctiveness, the population approaches global conformity in position.
Famously, Schelling’s [18] model showed that a macroscopic pattern of segregation does not warrant
the inference that all individuals are discriminatory. Here, a macroscopic pattern of conformity does not
mean that individuals lack desire for distinctiveness. Indeed, even if all agents have the same positive
fixed preference for distinctiveness, and adjust their positions in proportion to their distance from this
ideal, complete social conformity occurs and persists (it is approached monotonically as a limit). Figure 1c
also indicates that, given a perturbation from any equilibrium position, variance will again collapse to
zero, but with agents converging towards a new common position. The model thus offers an unexpected
generative mechanism for conformity. We now explore its robustness to selected variations.
3.3. Heterogeneous preferences for distinctiveness produce bifurcation in dynamics
In the scenarios presented thus far, agents had the same positive distinctiveness preference, δ. A
perhaps more plausible presumption is that individuals vary in their preferences for distinctiveness.
Will this change our results? We begin exploring this question by assuming distinctiveness preferences
to be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of s. Dynamics are not as
tractable analytically as in the previous case, and we turn to agent-based simulations. For this and all
1However, it can be shown that, when k is small and δ’s are identical, the equilibrium position is well approximated by δσ (0).
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Figure 2. Individual preferences drawn from a normal distribution. (a–d) Example trajectories of runs, with s as indicated. (e) The
proportion of simulation runs (of 30) for which the population converged as a function of s. (f ) Mean population position for convergent
runs as a function of s. This figure omits one outlier at (0.96,−5.46).
subsequent simulations, initial positions are drawn from U(−1, 1), N = 500, and the adjustment rate
k = 0.01. Before, with all agents having the same δ, we saw convergence to conformity. Is this result
robust to heterogeneous δs?
Strikingly, simulations indicate that to some extent, it is! Even with heterogeneous preferences
for distinctiveness, the population can still converge to a single position (figure 2a). However, if the
distribution of preferences is wide enough, the population instead diverges, with individual positions
growing ever farther apart (figure 2b). Thus, as we increase this heterogeneity, a type of bifurcation
occurs. For the normal distribution of preferences used in these simulations, this bifurcation occurs
around s = 1. Specifically, for s< 1, positions converge. For s> 1, positions diverge. For values of s very
close to 1, we find that some runs converge and some diverge, due to noise in the particular distributions
of initial positions and distinctiveness preferences (figure 2e).
The speed of convergence or divergence was slowest near this tipping point. This illustrates an
interesting feature of the model. When the standard deviation of distinctiveness preferences is near the
critical value of one, the population mean can change rapidly as individuals (asynchronously) update
their positions, while their positions relative to the mean will change very slowly. Figure 2d illustrates
that although convergence is assured, extremely long periods of ‘quasi-stability’ can be maintained,
during which the mean increases. We examined the limiting point of population convergence for
heterogeneously distributed δs for runs in which the population converges (i.e. runs in which the
standard deviation of positions was continuously decreasing after an initial transient period of
reorganization, which generally lasted about 150 time steps). We found that for convergent runs, the
closer s was to the critical threshold, the farther from the initial population mean was the point of
convergence proper, as seen in figure 2f.
These computational findings are supported by analytical results with two agents, having
distinctiveness preferences equal in magnitude but opposite in sign (i.e. δ1 = −δ2). For this case, it can be
proved that two agents will converge if and only if the standard deviation of the agents’ positions is less
than one (see appendix E).
3.4. Bimodal distributions of δs: a minority of non-conformists
In the previous section, we assumed a unimodal distribution of δs. However, it is also possible that
individuals would cluster around different preferred degrees of distinctiveness. There are many possible
multimodal distributions; we will consider two cases here.
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We first treat the simplest case of a population with exactly two types of individuals: conformists and
non-conformists. Conformists prefer to be at the population mean (δC = 0). Non-conformists prefer to be
distinct (δN > 0), but are otherwise identical. This case can be handled analytically. There are two free
parameters: δN, and the frequency of non-conformists in the population, p. In order to get dynamics,
we assume that conformists and non-conformists start at different initial positions, so that the standard
deviation of positions is non-zero.
For a wide range of conditions, the system again converges towards a single value (global conformity).
Figure 3 shows that the limiting position will be increasingly far from the initial position of the
conformists when there are more non-conformists (larger p) or when non-conformists have more extreme
preferences for distinctiveness (larger δN). Moreover, for every value of p, there is a critical value of δN,
above which the population does not converge. Specifically, this critical value is given by
δ∗N =
1√
p(1 − p) (3.8)
(see appendix D for derivation). Above this critical curve, the conformists and non-conformists will grow
ever farther apart, and their absolute positions will continue to increase. The area including and above
this separatrix is coloured black in figure 3.
Continuing to elaborate the model, we now explore dynamics assuming heterogeneous
distinctiveness preferences not with just two values as above, but with values clustered about two
distinct modes. For convergent runs, two possibilities suggest themselves. First, the majority, with
preferences for very moderate distinctiveness (conformists) could assimilate the minority of individuals,
who have more extreme preferences for distinctiveness (non-conformists). Second, a minority of non-
conformists, though small, could dramatically influence the positions of conformists, moving them
far from their initial positions. To explore these possibilities, we ran simulations in which each
agent’s distinctiveness preference was drawn from one of two possible continuous distributions. Non-
conformists’ δs were drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 3 and a standard deviation of
0.1. In order to highlight the pull of non-conformists, we let the mean δ of the conformists be negative.
Convergence to a positively valued position would thus indicate a strong influence of non-conformists.
Conformists’ δs were drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of −0.2 and a standard deviation of
0.3. Obviously, these numerical choices are purely illustrative.
In this computational experiment, when non-conformists were a small minority, they tended to be
assimilated into the majority as the population converged towards conformity, as in figure 4a. However,
a slightly larger minority of non-conformists, still only 8% of the population, exerted a much larger
influence on the majority (figure 4b). Figure 4c shows the limiting position of the population (for runs
that converged) for differently sized minority groups. This illustrates another central finding: a small
minority of extreme non-conformists can exert large influences on a population.
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4. Model 2: Preferences for absolute distance from the mean
In the model above, an agent’s distinctiveness preference was defined purely in terms of the population’s
dispersion (specifically, in units of standard deviation). We found that a consequence of this postulate is
that the population variance either approaches zero (global conformity) or diverges indefinitely. In real
populations, a stable level of diversity may be maintained (e.g. a stable political spectrum) without either
complete conformity or ever-widening divergence. What is the simplest and most natural way to endow
the model with this capacity?
In the preceding variant, where a multiple of standard deviation was the only distinctiveness metric,
we saw that agents can converge to the identical position—which perforce is the mean. They have
no problem with being average in that case. We will see that if we add to the previous framework
a little repulsion from the mean, the dynamics are altered substantially. In particular, diversity can
be maintained.
We need only revise our formula for an agent’s ideal position as follows:
x∗i (t) = x¯(t) + δi[σ (t) + ], (4.1)
where  is a positive constant. Thus, even if the population were at global conformity, an agent would
prefer to be δi units away from the mean. Note that as long as  is small, distinctiveness is still
approximated in terms of standard deviation when the variance is large. However, when the variance
is small, the new mean-repelling term will dominate. This model is otherwise identical to Model 1
(i.e. Model 1 is a special case of Model 2). How does this small revision change the dynamics?
If all individuals have the same distinctiveness preferences (i.e. ∀i, δi = δ), we get conformity as before.
However, instead of stabilizing at a single position, the population continues to move, as persistent
feedback to be δi units from the mean pushes the population ever upwards (figure 5a) (or downwards,
if δ < 0). Things become more interesting when preferences for distinctiveness are heterogeneous. For
several cases of two values of δ, it can be shown analytically that the distance between the two groups of
agents will stabilize at a non-zero value (see appendices D and E).
4.1. Travelling waves
Simulations further show that diversity will be stably maintained in populations with a wider range
of distinctiveness preferences, where stability is defined as the absence of consistent change in the
population positional variance after an initial transient period of reorganization (in this transient period,
agents effectively ‘sort’ by δ order). The absence of convergence is not the same thing as the absence of
movement, however. Small asymmetries in the distributions of distinctiveness preferences and/or initial
positions can lead to stable relative positions but a continuously changing population mean, as in the travelling
wave depicted in figure 5b.
We also found that our model extension could stabilize the clusters of conformists and non-
conformists described in the previous section. Figure 5c depicts a model run under conditions
identical to figure 4b, but with the new model extension. Instead of converging to global conformity
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Table 1. Summary of results for Models 1 and 2.
condition result
Model 1: distinctiveness preferences in units of standard deviation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
all agents have the same δ when all agents have the same δ, positions converge to a single point, approaching global
conformity despite a fixed preference for distinctiveness
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
heterogeneous δs (general) agents converge to a single position, as long as the variance in distinctiveness preferences is not too
large. When the variance of δs is large enough, the population diverges
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
an unstable equilibrium also exists in which all agents are initialized in their ideal positions. Minor
perturbations will lead to either convergence or divergence
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
normally distributed δs for normally distributed δs with a mean of zero, bifurcation between convergence and divergence
occurs at a SD of 1. Near this value there is high sensitivity to initial conditions regarding convergence
or divergence. For convergent runs, themeanposition canmove a large distance from its initial value
before the population converges
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bimodally distributed δs a relatively small minority of non-conformists with large δ can significantly change the position of
an overwhelming majority of agents who have very small δ (conformists)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
all convergent runs the limit point of convergence depends onbothδ and the initial distribution of individuals’ positions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Model 2: distinctiveness preferences include absolute distance frommean
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
all agents have the same δ agents converge to the same position, but this position continues to move
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
heterogeneous δs diversity is maintained, as the standard deviation converges to a non-zero constant
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
the population mean may continue to change, resulting in a ‘travelling wave’ of positions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bimodally distributed δs diversity can be maintained with persistent ‘factions’
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
as before, positional heterogeneity is stable in the population, resulting in persistent majority and
minority ‘factions’.
5. Discussion
This paper has attempted to bring increased rigour and explicit modelling to the general field of
individual distinctiveness and social dynamics. Using very simple notions of distinctiveness preferences
and simple rules of adjustment, we developed two models, each of which has produced several new
results (see table 1 for a summary).
Model 1 demonstrates an unexpected generative mechanism for a ubiquitous and important social
phenomenon: conformity. Individual adaptation to increase inter-agent similarity is, of course, sufficient
to generate conformity [19–24]. But we demonstrate that it is not necessary, and indeed show that the
quest for distinctiveness can also generate conformity. Conformity of course occurs when people strive for
similarity, but it evidently can also occur when people strive for distinctiveness. Perhaps, then, we should
not be surprised at its ubiquity.
9rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.2:140437
................................................
Moreover, this conformity was not dependent on our initial modelling assumption of identical
distinctiveness preferences. We showed that as long as the variance in individuals’ preferences is not
too large, the population still converges towards conformity even with heterogeneous distinctiveness
preferences. We then explored bimodally distributed distinctiveness preferences, finding that a small
minority of non-conformists (fewer than 10%) can significantly change the position even of a large
conformist majority. As in human history, so in the model: extremists can matter. Of course, society also
exhibits stable diversity.
Model 2 generalized Model 1 to include (absolute) repulsion from the mean, providing a simple
mechanism sufficient to generate and maintain diversity. Unexpectedly, the model also produces
travelling waves in which the positional distribution retains its form while moving to the right over
time. For bimodally distributed distinctiveness preferences, clusters akin to ‘factions’ emerge and
are sustained.
All in all, a very simple explicit model was shown to produce a wide range of unexpected results,
the central one being that conformity can emerge despite individual preferences for distinctiveness—
indeed, because of them! Further extensions such as the addition of space, agent movement, networks
and multiple dimensions (beyond our single positional one) would doubtless enrich the dynamics and
repay study, as would the addition of noise or bias to the agents’ assessments of positional distributions.
Contrary to inductivist legend, it often occurs in the history of science that theoretical work precedes and
guides empirical activity [25]. We would, of course, be delighted were the present theoretical work to
have the same effect. Meanwhile, this elementary model should contribute to the literature on social
dynamics, by providing: (i) mathematically specific definitions of individual distinctiveness, (ii) simple
agent adaptations meant to attain them, and (iii) the collective dynamics that result.
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Appendix A. The model
An agent’s ideal location is
x∗i (t) = x¯(t) + δi[σ (t) + ], (A 1)
where x¯(t) is the mean location of the agents in the population, σ (t) is the standard deviation of those
locations, δi is the distinctiveness preference of agent i and  is a factor representing absolute repulsion
from the population mean. Model 1 is defined by  = 0, and Model 2 by  > 0.
At each time step, the agent updates its position according to
xi = k[x∗i (t) − xi(t)], (A 2)
where xi(t) is the current position of agent i and k ∈ (0, 1) is an adjustment rate.
In the main text, figure 1c illustrates the point of convergence for simulations in which all agents
have the same distinctiveness preferences (∀i, δi = δ) for several different initial distributions of agent
positions. Agents’ initial positions were initially randomly drawn from a modified beta distribution with
support [−1, 1]. This transformation was necessary, because in the standard beta distribution, values are
instead drawn from [0, 1]. Figure 6 illustrates the shape of these distributions. For all other simulations
discussed in the main text, initial positions were drawn from a uniform distribution in [−1, 1].
Appendix B. Derivation of the change in population mean
Here we derive an equation for the change in the population mean for Model 1. Most generally, we
start with
x¯ = x¯(t + 1) − x¯(t). (B 1)
From equations (A 1) and (A 2), it follows that for an agent i,
xi(t + 1) = xi(t) + k[x¯(t) + δiσ (t) − xi(t)]. (B 2)
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Figure 6. Probability densities of initial distributions of agent positions featured in the main text, figure 1c. Distributions are beta
distributions, transformed so that the support is [−1, 1].
Summing over all agents gives us
x¯(t + 1) = 1
N
∑
i
xi(t + 1)
= 1
N
∑
i
xi(t) +
k
N
∑
i
[x¯(t) + δiσ (t) − xi(t)]
= x¯(t) + k
N
∑
i
[x¯(t) + δiσ (t) − xi(t)]. (B 3)
Then, by equations (B 1) and (B 3), we obtain the result shown in the main text,
x¯ = k
N
∑
i
[x¯(t) + δiσ (t) − xi(t)]
= kσ (t)
N
∑
i
δi. (B 4)
Appendix C. Proof that the population always converges when all agents
have the same distinctiveness preference
Under Model 1, let all agents have the same distinctiveness preference, i.e. ∀i, δi = δ. Since each individual
records the same population mean and standard deviation, it follows that at time t, all agents will have
the same ideal position:
x∗(t) = x¯(t) + δσ (t). (C 1)
By equations (A 2) and (C 1), the update rule for each agent is given by
xi(t + 1) = xi(t) + k[x¯(t) + δσ (t) − xi(t)]. (C 2)
We will prove that this rule leads the population to converge by showing that the variance of agents’
positions at time t + 1 is always less than the variance of agents’ positions at time t. Recall that the
equation for variance is
σ 2 = E[(x2)] − x¯2. (C 3)
At time t + 1, the variance is given by
σ 2(t + 1) = 1
N
∑
i
x2i (t + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
− x¯2(t + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
. (C 4)
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We decompose the problem by first solving for P and Q, as shown in equation (C 4). To make the
derivation cleaner, we will drop the ‘(t)’ when indicating variables taken at time t. We start by solving
for Q.
x¯2(t + 1) =
[
1
N
∑
i
(xi + k[x¯ + δσ − xi])
]2
(C 5)
= [x¯ + k[x¯ + δσ − x¯]]2 (C 6)
= [x¯ + kδσ ]2 (C 7)
= x¯2 + k2δ2σ 2 + 2kδσ x¯. (C 8)
Now we solve for P.
x2i (t + 1) = [xi + kx¯ + kδσ − kxi]2 (C 9)
= x2i + 2kx¯xi + 2kδσxi − 2kx2i + k2x¯2 + 2k2δσ x¯ − 2k2x¯xi + k2δ2σ 2 − 2k2δσxi + k2x2i
= (1 − k)2x2i + k2δ2σ 2 + k2x¯2 + 2k[x¯xi + δσxi] + 2k2[δσ x¯ − x¯xi − δσxi]. (C 10)
Taking the expectation of P (summing over all the i’s and dividing by N) gives us
E[(x2(t + 1))] = (1 − k)2E[(x2)] + k2δ2σ 2 + 2kx¯2 + 2kδσ x¯ − k2x¯2. (C 11)
Reassembling these components, we see that
σ 2(t + 1) = E[(x2(t + 1))] − x¯2(t + 1)
= (1 − k)2E[(x2)] + k2δ2σ 2 + 2kx¯2 + 2kδσ x¯ − k2x¯2 − x¯2 − k2δ2σ 2 − 2kδσ x¯
= (1 − k)2E[(x2)] − (1 − k)2x¯2
= (1 − k)2[E[(x2)] − x¯2]. (C 12)
Combining equations (C 3) and (C 12) produces the equation given in the main text:
σ 2(t + 1) = (1 − k)2σ 2(t). (C 13)
Since k is bounded in (0, 1), equation (C 13) implies at each time step, the variance of agent positions
will be strictly less than in the previous time step. In other words, the population variance will always
converge to zero: agents will occupy the same position, as claimed.
Appendix D. Proof that up to a critical value of δN, when there are
conformists and non-conformists, positions converge
Assume two homogeneous subpopulations: conformists (C) and non-conformists (N). Conformists want to
be like the average individual, so δC = 0. Non-conformists want to be different (but to an identical extent),
so δN = δ > 0. The frequency of conformists in the population is p, so the frequency of non-conformists
is 1 − p. We will work out the maths using the assumptions of Model 2, but will show that the results
specialize to Model 1 (by setting  = 0).
The mean position is
x¯ = pxC + (1 − p)xN, (D 1)
and the variance of positions is
σ 2 = p(1 − p)(xN − xC)2, (D 2)
so the standard deviation is
σ = [p(1 − p)]1/2(xN − xC). (D 3)
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Now we solve for how the agents’ positions change over time.
xC = k[x¯ − xC] (D 4)
= k[pxC + (1 − p)XN − xC] (D 5)
= k(1 − p)(xN − xC) (D 6)
and
xN = k[x¯ − xN + δ(σ + )] (D 7)
= k[pxC + (1 − p)xN − xN + δ[p(1 − p)]1/2(xN − xC) + δ] (D 8)
= k[(−p + δ[p(1 − p)]1/2)(xN − xC) + δ]. (D 9)
We are interested in convergence and divergence of the two populations, so let us define a variable
D to be the distance between conformists and non-conformists, and observe how this distance changes
over time.
D = xN − xC
= k[(δ[p(1 − p)]1/2 − 1)(xN − xC) + δ]. (D 10)
An equilibrium will exist when D = 0. Setting equation (D 10) to zero yields
xN − xC = δ1 − δ[p(1 − p)]1/2 . (D 11)
When  > 0 (Model 2), we can get stable coexistence of two populations separated by a fixed distance.
If  = 0 (Model 1), then the population will either converge to a single value or diverge. We began by
assuming that xN > xC, and there is no mechanism by which this relationship can reverse. Therefore,
stability/convergence will only occur if the denominator of the right-hand side of equation (D 11) is
positive. More precisely, the condition for convergence in Model 1 and stability in Model 2 is
δ <
1√
p(1 − p) . (D 12)
This implies the separatrix equation (equation (3.8)) of the main text. Importantly, when  > 0 (Model 2),
stability does not imply that the agents remain in the same positions over time, only that they are in
the same relative positions—that is, the distance between the conformist and non-conformist populations
does not change. Indeed, the population can get caught in a feedback loop in which the average position
increases indefinitely, as illustrated in the main text.
Appendix E. Stability and convergence with two agents possessing equal
but opposite distinctiveness preferences
Consider a very simple case of Model 2: a population of two agents, each with equal but opposite
distinctiveness preferences (i.e. δ1 = −δ2). For simplicity, let δ1 = δ and δ2 = −δ, and assume δ ≥ 0. We will
further assume that at t = 0, x1 > x2. Owing to the relationship between the two agents’ distinctiveness
preferences, this ordering will not change. The agents’ mean position is given by x¯ = (x1 + x2)/2, and
their standard deviation by σ = 12 (x1 − x2).
The agents update their positions according to the following:
x1 = k[x¯ − x1 + δ1(σ + )] (E 1)
= k
[
x1 + x2
2
− x1 + δ2 (x1 − x2) + δ
]
(E 2)
and
x2 = k
[
x1 + x2
2
− x2 − δ2 (x1 − x2) − δ
]
. (E 3)
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Let us define D as the distance between the two agents, so that D = x1 − x2. This distance changes
according to
D = x1 − x2
= k[x2 − x1 + δ(x1 − x2) + 2δ]
= k[(δ − 1)(x1 − x2) + 2δ]. (E 4)
We want to know if and where the equilibrium lies. In other words, when do the agents stop moving
relative to one another, so that D = 0? Setting the right-hand side of equation (E 4) to zero, we obtain
x1 − x2 = 2δ1 − δ . (E 5)
Equation (E 5) implies two things. First, if  = 0 (Model 1), then the only equilibrium occurs when the
agents occupy the same location. If the distance between the two agents is growing, it will continue to
increase. Second, if  > 0 (Model 2), then the agents will reach a stable relative positioning if and only
if δ < 1.
It is noteworthy that if δ = 1 (a singularity of equation (E 5)), then the standard deviation of the δs
is also 1, which was the transition point between convergence and divergence for normally distributed
distinctiveness preferences obtained via simulations in the main text.
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